

Hoosier Archives was originally a periodic listing of the Diplomacy archives of Walter Buchanan, R. R. #3, Lebanon, Indiana 46052, telephone (317) 482-2824; Archives Director, Postal Diplomacy Congress, and V-P/Treas., International Diplomacy Association. It is now primarily a Diplomacy gazette devoted to articles on good play, demonstration games such as The Grudge Game (1971BC) now wrapping up, rating systems, and game news. Information from the archives is vital for all this and is available to the public as well. Although the archives is virtually complete in at least xerox form, missing undamaged originals are solicited, either for purchase or a loan to permit xeroxing. (See the last archives listing in Hoosier Archives #53 for zines needed.) Many original spares are now available from the archives; more are solicited so as to make them available to others. A subscription to Hoosier Archives is 15/\$2.00 or 7/\$1.00; back issues are available for 15¢ apiece (20% discount for all available). Ask for #73 to get a list of all articles through #74. This is Albatross Press publication #92.



### INTO THE ARCHIVES NO. 41

Len Lakofka has really been getting prolific lately with the strategy and tactics articles. How he manages to rip them off plus host extravaganzas such as DIPCON V is a real amazement. Anyway, here is an interesting little gem on multi-player alliances.

#### FOUR-PLAYER ALLIANCES

by Len Lakofka

When 1901 openings are mentioned, a great deal of time is expended in discussing independent and two-player actions for each country. Yet why dabble with two-player alliances, or even three? Why not go for the whole ball game at once--ally with three other players until 1903 or so. In this way, you can wipe out 3 foes at once and be in position to move aggressively in the middle game.

The rules of thumb to follow are two: (1) do not place yourself in a position where you can be attacked directly by all three foes or all three allies, and (2) try to avoid situations in which, after 1903, you will have to meet one or more allies head on. Try to keep interior lines that secure what you have gained.

Thus, a French-British-German-Austrian alliance is a deadly contract for Germany and/or Austria. They are surrounded by foes and their "allies" will keep pushing right in their direction. But a French-English-Turkish-Russian alliance has one safe border with an ally and room to expand without tripping over your friends too early in the alliance. Lines like England, Italy, Austria, and Russia are also very playable. All four allies can expand into neutral areas or into enemy territories without tripping over other allies. The question to ask about such a large alliance is (1) what can I do if this border or that is secure? and (2) will I be in position to negotiate after the alliance splits up? If you do not gain enough in the alliance and/or your lines are extended too far out, the alliance is not good for you.

Let's look at one of these four-player alliances: a French-German-Austrian-Russian alliance.

France: F Bre-Engl, A Par-Gas, A Mar-Spa  
 Germany: F Kie-Den, A Ber-Kie, A Mun-Tyo!  
 Austria: A Vie-Tri!, A Bud-Ser, F Tri-Alb  
 Russia: F Sev-Bla, A War-Ukr, A Mos-StP!, F StP-Bot

Then in the Fall of 1901:

France: F Eng-Lon, A Gas-Spa, A Spa-Par  
 Germany: F Den-Nth, A Kie-Hol, A Tyo-Pie!  
 Austria: A Tri-Tyo!, F Alb-Gre, A Ser (S) F Alb-Gre  
 Russia: F Sev-Bla, A Ukr-Rum, A StP-Nwy, F Bot-Swe

The winter builds would be:

France: F Bre, F Mar  
 Germany: F Kie, A Mun

Austria: F Tri, A Bud  
 Russia: A Mos, A War

Unless the other countries have acted to stem one country directly in Spring 1901, they will be in extreme trouble in 1902 and the world will crash in on them. Notice if one of the three has moved strongly versus one of the four, a restructure of the four-player alliance can even be negotiated!

Thus, don't think small--go for all the marbles at once instead of trying to move one alliance at a time!

### THE GRUDGE GAME (1971BC) Early Summer 1907

At the beginning of this game, I promised a Gamesmaster's commentary at its conclusion. However, with the second part of Edi Birsan's victory statement below, I find it has practically all been said for me. During the game, most of the players kept me informed of their actions and Edi sent me a great deal of correspondence as well. I can therefore vouch for the accuracy of his victor's statement and further say that I think this victory was one of the most brilliant kind. One may say that Edi had a great deal of luck but I feel in Diplomacy as well as in other games of skill, one tends to make his own luck. I also feel that the few comments about the game being a giveaway were generated in moments of passion when the speaker temporarily forgot that the name of the game is Diplomacy. Edi did a brilliant job in that respect, the most outstanding example of which was the setting up of Gene Prosnitz for a stab and then making Gene think others were responsible. I could cite other examples, but I would only be repeating what I have already published from Edi. All in all, I think Edi has demonstrated what many of the current rating systems and polls display, that he ranks at the top of current active players.

Before I publish the supply center chart below, allow me to say that this game was a real pleasure to GM, and what with all the inside information supplied me, a pleasure to watch unfold before me. Even though he was one of the players and lost, I think Rod Walker would agree that his original idea of a grudge game bore excellent fruit and I hope my idea of converting it into a top quality demonstration game helped too. The game also set a record as the fastest interstate postal game ever played, a flat 7 months, and I think this is a real tribute to Edi Birsan, considering the top flight opposition. It is also a tribute to all the players that the game received the Johnny Award at DIPCON V for being "The Outstanding Regular Diplomacy Game of 1972."

Lastly, I think the game was of real value as a demonstration game (and aided by Rick Brook's fine analysis) in that it showed that Allan Calhauer's Wicked Witch of the North and South, England and Turkey respectively, could be effectively dealt with. This also confirms my opinion that the countries in Diplomacy are more equal than most people think. Allow me to propose what I will modestly call Buchanan's Law! "In Diplomacy, the equality of the countries is directly proportional to the quality of play."

Now, in conclusion, the supply center chart:

	00	01	02	03	04	05	06
AUSTRIA (Len Lakofka)	3	5	5	5	6	5	7
ENGLAND (Gene Prosnitz)	3	4	3	-			
FRANCE (Edi Birsan)	3	6	6	9*	11	15*	15 <sup>2</sup>
GERMANY (Jeff Key)	3	5	5	5	3	2	2
ITALY (Rod Walker)	3	4	4	4	5	5	6*
RUSSIA (John Smythe)	4	6	7	7	7	6	4
TURKEY (Buddy Tretick) <sup>1</sup>	3	4	4	4	2	1	-

Note: An "\*" denotes that for some reason a unit was not built although the necessary supply center for doing so had been acquired.

<sup>1</sup>Doug Beyerlein took over this position in Fall 1904 when Buddy Tretick ceased to submit moves.

<sup>2</sup>The remaining players conceded the game to France in Spring 1907.

And now, what you have all been waiting for so patiently, the concluding part of Edi Birsan's victory statement!

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A WHIRLWIND OF KNIVES (Part 2)  
by Edi Birsan

1903 saw the eastern world rip itself apart by three unco-ordinated stabs going in a massive circle: Germany hitting Russia, Russia attacking Austria and Austria moving on the Germans. I couldn't allow the Germans to be taken out by the Austrians as it would have altered the eastern power balance too much in favor of Austria and any Austrian attack on Germany usually takes out Munich, which I wasn't about to let fall into any non-German hands unless they were French. I also didn't want anything to interfere with the mopping up of the Turks, so the Russian attack on Austria was a definite danger. Germany was forced to turn around and face the Austrians and planned to move against them in the fall and then in the following turns to shift back against the Russians. All this placed divisions within the eastern powers and prevented the formation of a "stop Birsan/France" movement which I'm sure Iakofka wanted to lead in a terrible way. It also helped me to decide what to do after the English were gone (they would be gone at the end of 1903).

I was committed to backing the Germans if they had a chance at winning the game. This was a commitment out of reason more than anything else for had the Germans been in such a position I would not have any position to attack them with a chance of success, thus forcing me to press an attack against the Russians in the north or the Italians in the south. The Austrian attack changed all that once the Germans decided to move south one turn and then to move north the next turn. This meant that the Germans would be going nowhere fast and that they would isolate themselves from the two eastern powers that could have come to their aid: Russia and Austria. I therefore planned to set Jeff up in the Fall of 1904 for a quick blitz out of Burgundy and the North Sea. Barring any unforeseen miracles such as the Italians attacking me or the Russians falling apart, Jeff would be caught just as he pressed an attack on Russia.

Through 1903 I moved to take over England in one shot during the fall and tried to negotiate with Smythe over Germany. Smythe didn't want to make it in 1904 as he bought the German line of moving on Austria and knew that he would need their help with the Turks and the Austrians allying. I decided to risk the attack alone in 1904 Fall as the Russians would be sucked into the fight by the German attack on Russia at the same time. At that time, it was agreed that the Germans would be divided in two with Belgium, Holland and Munich going to France and Berlin and Denmark going to Russia. I wanted to have Kiel go to whomever got there first (thus keeping an incentive to press the attack at all times), but John said no and insisted on the Baltic center for his own. I agreed with reservations knowing full well that if I got the chance I would take Kiel and keep going east, possibly timed with the Italians moving east against the Austrians.

In setting up the stab on Jeff, I planned to slip an army behind Munich using my favorite out-of-the-way approach through Piedmont and Tyrolia. This would force the Italians out of Tyrolia and allow me to place an army in Tyrolia where it could be used against Austria if he kept up his alliance with Turkey.

The Fall 1904 attack on Germany went off like a champagne bottle: a sharp pop and a massive flow of irresistible force. I had offered to give Jeff Belgium seeing that I had taken out all of England. This would make the unit in Holland move and allow me to force it to retreat by a supported convoyed attack from the North Sea. I slipped into Tyrolia as the Italians came down from there to protect Venice and I also piled right into Munich as the Germans moved in a shift against the Russians. This came upon the board right after a realignment of the eastern powers once more against Turkey only this time the Turks were really caught and shafted beyond hope of recovery. Germany was now on the ropes with French armies in Holland, Belgium, Munich and Tyrolia and no hope of relief.

Smythe, seeing my massive shift into Germany, still demanded that he take Denmark, Kiel and Berlin even though he was nowhere near taking any one of them without my support. I could have taken Kiel on the next year and locked up Berlin and Denmark myself, but Smythe insisted that he get Kiel, Denmark and Berlin regardless. This was the background to the second so-called "giveaway."

Considering the realignment of all three eastern powers and Smythe's unwillingness to budge on the territory problems, I had to make a quick decision in regard to Germany. If I pressed my attack directly on Germany and tried to take over Kiel and Berlin, I would be fighting Smythe and Key with the spectre of a united eastern world coming after me led by

Smythe. If I didn't press the attack on Key and let Smythe take over the areas, it would allow him to grow so large as to be the major power on the board even after I had chopped up England as he would have an easier power expansion route to more supply centers than I would...i.e., the expansion into Austria and the Balkans is much easier for Russia than an attack on Italy and then into the Balkans is for France.

The only other way out was to get Key to ally with me, the guy who stabbed him, so as to make use of the German armies in the east to stop the expected eastern power block from coming on central Germany and buying time for my fleets to invest the north and south seas. I called Jeff (W04) and to my surprise not a single one of the eastern powers had made contact with him in regard to guaranteeing his survival if he would join them against me. It seems that Smythe's greed for the German centers and Lakofka's growing interest in Italy and Russia were precluding them from a rational policy. Luckily, Jeff made the offer to me first that I let him survive in exchange for him pushing into the east. This was fantastic even though I wasn't quite sure of believing him but everything was going so well (until Fall 1905 I had one move fail out of 57 written orders) that I figured I'd see what his removals were and if they were as we had planned, he wouldn't be in any position to do anything to me anyway, so why not trust him.

With the winter removals of Germany, I began to really get paranoid about the eastern powers. With Germany and France obviously aligned by the removals (although I played up Key being in a hurry to retake Munich to Smythe as an explanation), it was equally obvious that unless the three eastern powers got together France was going to roll over the board. Therefore, I decided that since their best strategy was to attack me, I'd best hit them first. You might call it reverse paranoia as its basis is that the other guy thinks you are after him (in this case, correctly) and you know he thinks so (in this case, they didn't for some reason) so you then plan to hit them as they must hit you if they follow their own perceived logic. (How's that gem of reason grab you????)

Anyway, I had to move on all of them quickly. This was the height of the whirlwind of knives as I virtually stabbed everyone on the board in anticipation of them hitting me. Walker and I had arranged a stand-off in Tunis with my one southern fleet. I instead moved to Piedmont with an army and went right into the Tyrrhenian Sea so I had a position to take out one Italian home center guaranteed in the fall and with a little luck and oversight on Walker's part, maybe two. With Lakofka, I supported the Germans into Vienna from my perch in Tyrolia which destroyed an Austrian army outright. In the north, I moved on the Skagerrak, thus violating the deal I had with Smythe and setting up an attack on Sweden with German help. When I read the Spring 1905 moves, I was still being protected by some strange patron saint of Diplomacy as all the moves worked with the wonderful bonus of Walker and Lakofka moving as if they were planning an immediate war against each other. I really felt stupid for a minute. Here I was planning on being at war with all of Europe and going after every single one of them when, kingo, nobody but nobody attacks me! I thought, "Mi gahd, what have I dum!!!!? Oy way!"

There was no way out of it now I thought; they are all going to come after me. I talked to Smythe and he was after me half heartedly. I heard from Lakofka, figuring he would be ticked off at me for the German support into Vienna, but no, he wants to nail Walker. Walker writes and says he doesn't want to fight me and wants to fight Lakofka. The Parisians went running around the mail room screaming FAR OUT!!! I told Walker that I would support him into Trieste from Tyrolia and arranged for the Germans to cut support from Budapest while I would also pull out of Tyrrhenian Sea. I informed the Austrians that I wouldn't support the Germans in Vienna in exchange for them making peace with me. (It was actually a somewhat empty gesture on my part as Army Tyrolia was going to support Army Piedmont to Venice in the fall so he couldn't support the Germans). At it looked to me, the Italians would make a backstab into the Austrians attacking Trieste and possibly Constantinople or Greece at the same time as I took out most of domestic Italy. I figured that Len would go into a rage and never would ally with Walker in the game against me and even if he did, there wouldn't be much left as all I wanted was rights over domestic Italy and Tunis. This was the so-called "third giveaway": Walker being nailed by me in the Fall of 1905, losing both Naples and Venice while attacking Trieste and taking Greece and Constantinople from the Austrians. More than a "give-away" it was a bad choice on Walker's part for not playing a more defensive role in his home country with a foreign fleet in the Tyrrhenian Sea.

The Winter of 1905 saw the game stabilize for two consecutive moves, leading to the concession in the Spring of 1907. Austria maintained a steady flow of rage at the Italians and refused to jump on the bandwagon of "Stop Birsan" that Walker was finally mounting. In fact, the Austrian reaction was "I'll run him over with that goddamned bandwagon." In the center, the German and French forces made gains against Warsaw, taking it in the Fall of 1906 when the Austrians slipped into Rumania to really break the back of Russian resistance. In the north, the Russians were tossed out of several sea areas in preparation for the northern push against St. Petersburg. In the south, a bad move by myself allowed the Italians to recapture Naples and lose a freshly spring-captured Rome in the fall. But the investments by several fleets were paying premiums in the south as Tunis or Rome was bound to fall in 1907 as was all of northern Russia. The concession came in the wake of all this and ended the game amidst grunts and groans from several quarters.

In looking back, the so-called "give aways" are easier to understand: in one case, it was an attempt to go on record with a suicide tactic for threatening use in future games (Prosnitz) or the failure by the other powers to guarantee survival to a weak power (Key) or the misjudgment of a situation by a country that risked too much and was caught.

Billed as a Grudge Game, it has probably generated more grudges than went into it. Although I might add that the game allowed for some of the participants to have an excuse to write to each other again. On my part, I hold no ill will towards the others now and must again affirm that we should play each game separately but equally, or at least as much as we can.

#### INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY ASSOCIATION

Membership in the IDA is now over 100 and things are progressing along very well. A general meeting of the organization was held at DIPCON V as well as several meetings of the Council and I was very gratified at the progress that was made. Some of the things that were accomplished were a final ironing out of a constitutional draft, an agreement to take over sponsorship of the annual Johnny Awards, an endorsement of Chicago as the DIPCON VI site, a vote to make Allan Calhauer, the game's inventor, and John Moet, the President of GRI, honorary members, the establishment of a Ratings Committee under Doug Beyerlein's chairmanship, proposals for the Player's Handbook set forth, and discussion of many projects both substantive and of a financial nature, such as the Commemorative Stamp Project headed up by Bob Lamb. All the details will of course be set out in Diplomacy Review, the organizational magazine. For information on how you can be a part of all this, write the Acting Membership Secretary, Steve Ball, at 5605 Virgilwood Drive, Greensboro, N.C. 27409.

#### GAME OPENINGS

The following is a partial list of Diplomacy game zine editors taken from the "Archives Publishers Survey" in Hosier Archives #81 that are believed to currently have game openings in their zines (note: R denotes regular games and V denotes variants):

5. Hal Naus, 1011 Barrett Avenue, Chula Vista, Calif. 92011 (R)
10. Len Lakofka, 4970 N. Marine Drive, Apt. 525, Chicago, Ill. 60640 (R)
13. Chris Schleicher, 5122 W. Carmen, Chicago, Ill. 60630 (R)
22. Lewis Pulsipher, 423 N. Main, Bellevue, Mich. 49021 (V)
24. Ray Bowers, 625 Evans, Kirkwood, Mo. 63122 (R, "girls' game")
27. Tony Pandin, 10406 Shaker Blvd., Cleveland, Ohio 44104 (R)
28. Robert Ward, 8665 Florin Road, #176, Sacramento, Cal. 95828 (R)
30. Stephen Cooper, 3073 S. Buchanan, B-2, Arlington, Va. 22206 (R)
35. Stan Wrobel, 7 Poland Village Blvd., Poland, Ohio 44514 (R)
44. Fred Winter, 2625 El Rancho Drive, Brookfield, Wis. 53005 (R)
45. Edi Birsan, 48-20 39th Street, Long Island City, N.Y. 11104 (R)
46. Joseph Antosiak, 3637 Arden Avenue, Brookfield, Ill. 60513 (R, V)
48. John Boyer, 117 Garland Drive, Carlisle, Pa. 17013 (R)
55. David Hunt, 217 E. Front Street, Adrian, Mich. 49221 (R, novices only)

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